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A PROMISE WITH "OPTION TO CANCEL" AS VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION
A promise creates no legally enforceable duty unless some considera-
tion is given for it; but generally the law does not investigate as to its
value or amount. This led Mr. justice Holmes to say: "This being
so, consideration is as much a form as a seal."' The reaction against
mere "formality" has led others to suggest that the time has come for
the abolition of the requirement of consideration as well as for the
abolition of the common-law operation of a seal. It is believed that
the abolition of the second would be undesirable2 and that an attempt to
abolish the first would fail. As Dean Pound, speaking of nudum
pactum, says :3 "there is something more than the fetish of a tradi-
tional Latin phrase with the hallmark of Roman legal science behind
our reluctance to enforce all deliberate promises simply as such."
In Gurfein v. Werbelovsky (1922) 97 Conn. 703, 118, Atl. 32,
speaking of a bilateral contract, the court said: "Of course, the right
to enforce the buyer's promise to buy is such a consideration, and if
that right existed, even for the shortest space of time, it is enough to
bring the contract into existence." Here the terms of the agreement
were as follows: "We have this day accepted your order for 5 cases
of plate glass .... The above cases are to be shipped within 3 months
from date. You to have the option to cancel the above order before ship-
ment." The buyer insistently demanded the goods and finally sued
for damages for refusal to ship. The court held that the "option to
cancel" did not render the agreement unenforceable.
The contract was bilateral, creating a duty to pay as well as a duty
to ship, each promise being the consideration for the other. The
"option to cancel" possessed by the buyer meant that he had the legal
power of extinguishing the mutual duties. This power would die
instantly upon shipment by the defendant. The possession of such a
power does not in itself nullify the duty of the buyer who possesses
such power. It does not give him the privilege of not paying. It
merely gives him the power to create such a privilege. The exercise
of the power requires a notice sent by the buyer and received by the
'Krell v. Codinan (18gi) 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578.
2See the doubtful case of Fountain v. Stein (1922) 97 Conn. 61g, 118 Atl. 47;
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 4O9. There ought to be available one method of
making an enforceable promise without invoking the doctrine of consideration.
'Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922) 280.
Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. 1g9g) 119, note 2: "The requirement of considera-
tion is not merely to test the promisor's intention to assume a legal duty. It seems
more accurate to say that consideration is the criterion to determine whether the
customary notions of justice prevailing in the community require the legal enforce-
ment of a promise. In this aspect the idea of consideration assimilates itself to
the idea of causa in the Roman and Continental law, and the two ideas differ only
where the mores of the two communities differ."
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seller before shipment of the goods.4 It could not be exercised merely
by refusing to receive the goods or by refusing to pay.
The decision is correct in analysis and sound in policy. The con-
sideration given by the plaintiff was of substantial value and did not
approach a mere "form."' 5  A.L.C.
It is universally acknowledged that a thief acquires no title to a thing
stolen and can pass no better title to a purchaser, even though the
purchaser buys in good faith. So generally accepted is this rule that a
citation of authorities is unnecessary. Its logic, however, is question-
able. A thief does not get a complete title, but analysis shows that he
does acquire an interest which is of some value. He has possession-
that is, physical custody plus an intention to exclude all others-and
although wrongful, yet if left undisturbed for the statutory limitation
period, will ripen into a perfect legal title. Furthermore, it seems that
if he is disturbed by anyone except the true owner or one claiming
through or on behalf of the latter, his possession will be protected. It
is true that diligent search has failed to disclose a reported case in which
the precise point has arisen," but no good reason appears why the well
settled rule that possession, even though wrongfully acquired, will be
protected against trespassers,2 should not apply. The law protects
possession to preserve the peace. Why then should not the same pro-
tection be afforded the possession of a thief that is given to the posses-
sion acquired by trespass or conversion, which does not amount to a
crime.3 The application of the rule that a thief acquires no title may
' The court said: ".... . the contract is framed on the theory that it remains
enforceable by either party unless and until the plaintiff brings home notice of
cancellation before shipment"
*It may be observed that the plaintiff, so far as his detrimental jural relations
are concerned, is in the same legal position that he would be in if he made an ordi-
nary offer to buy glass to be accepted only by actual shipment of the glass ordered.
In such case his duty to pay would be enforceable only after shipment So is it
in the instant case. In each case he is under liability to the creation of an en-
forceable duty to pay by the defendant's exercise of his power by shipment of the
glass; and in each case he has power to revoke by a notice delivered. But this
does not prove that Werbelovsky was not bound to ship, even though in the case
of an unaccepted offer the offeree is not bound to ship. In each case the jural
position of the plaintiff is detrimental. In the instant case he offered to put
himself in that position in return for the defendant's promise to ship and the
defendant accepted by promising. In the supposed case the plaintiff put himself
in the detrimental jural position for nothing, and the offeree was not bound to ship
because he had promised nothing.
See Bordwell, Property In Chattels (1916) 29 HA-Rv. L. REV. 374; see (1921)
34 HAgv. L. REv. 681 (transfer of stolen automobile purchased by bankrupt in
good faith held a transfer of property within meaning of Bankruptcy Act).
'Darlington, Personal Property (89) 37, note I.
" See Anderson v. Gouldberg (1892) 5, Minn. 294, 53 N. W. 636.
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